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The Role of the Judiciary in India's
Constitutional Democracy
By MAUREEN CALLAHAN VANDERMAY"

I. Introduction
After decades of social and political turmoil, India gained independence from British rule in 1947. In the period leading up to independence and during the first several years of India's existence as an
independent nation, a Constituent Assembly met to draft the nation's
Constitution. The Constitution produced through that process was
crafted to meet the particular needs of the Indian subcontinent.
Combining elements of the British and U.S. forms of government and
encouraging the traditional local councils known as "panchavats," the
Indian Constitution was a revolutionary document. Instead of preserving a status quo caste-based underclass, the Indian framers sought
to create a fundamentally different, more egalitarian Indian society.
In the words of one of the Constitution's principal architects, their
goal was to remove India from medievalism and create a society based
on "law, individual merit, and secular education." 2 This vision for
post-British India is reflected in the Constitution's numerous provisions that mandate social change, such as those that abolish untoucha* Professor of Law, Willamette University College of the Law, Salem, Oregon. Research for this Article was funded by a 1992-93 Indo-American Fellowship Grant. The

author wishes to thank Lydia Z. Gomes of the Council for the International Exchange of
Scholars in Washington, D.C. for coordinating her research trip and L.S. Suri of the American Institute of Indian Studies in New Delhi for his unfailing assistance in India. P.M.
Bakshi, Director of the Indian Law Institute in New Delhi, provided considerable guidance
with respect to Indian constitutional law. Mat Farmer, James A.R. Nafziger. Susan L.
Smith, and Michael B. Wise provided numerous insightful comments on an earlier draft.
1. For the principal characteristics of the Indian Constitution, see infra notes 17-31
and accompanying text.
2. GRANvx.L AusnIN, THE INDiAN CONsTrrmoN: CORNERSTONE OF A NATtON 26

(1966) (quoting K. Santhanam, HNDUSTAN Tu.ms, Sept. 8, 1946, (Magazine)). Prime Minister Jawarhalal Nehru articulated a similar view of the Constituent Assembly's task in
stating-. "The first task of this Assembly is to free India through a new constitution, to feed
the starving people, and to clothe the naked masses, and to give every Indian the fullest
opportunity to develop himself according to his capacity." Id. For a dicussion of Nehru's
importance in the drafting of India's Constitution, see generally NEHRU AND THE CONSnr.
TUmoN (Rajeev Davan & Thomas Paul eds., 1992).
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bility,3 prohibit discrimination on the basis of religion, race, caste, sex,
and place of birth,4 and outlaw forced labor- and the employment of
children in factories.6 This vision of a reformed Indian society is also
reflected in Parliament's emphasis on land reform during the first
years of the Indian republic's existence. 7 During the early years, India's Parliament attempted to shift the ownership of large tracts of
agricultural lands from the landowning class known as "zamindars" to
the impoverished Indians who worked the land.8
The Indian Supreme Court has frequently interfered with the implementation of the framers' reformist vision on the grounds that the
actions in question violate the Constitution's individual liberties provisions. 9 Although the Constituent Assembly's debates are replete with
statements referring to the Judiciary as the guardian of individual
rights under the Constitution, 10 the debates also suggest that both the
Constitution's protections of individual liberties and the Judiciary's
role as guardian thereof were to be read in light of India's pressing
need for social reform." The Indian Supreme Court, however, has
often ignored the framers' circumscribed vision of individual liberties
and its own guardianship role. The Court has instead fashioned for
the Indian Judiciary a role similar to that of the U.S. Supreme Court
as defined by Chief Justice Marshall in Marbury v. Madison.12 The
Indian Supreme Court thus conceives of the Indian Judiciary as both
the protector of individual liberties against political branch aggression
3. INDIA CONST. art. 17. For a brief description of untouchability, sce infra notes 16569 and accompanying text.
4. Id. art. 15.
5. Id. art. 23.
6. Id. art. 24. This is not, of course, to suggest that India has fully achieved these
objectives. For example, the use of child labor in India is well documented. See, e.g., Robert Evans, UN Says At Least 73 Million in Global Child Labour, Reuters World Service,
June 10, 1996, available in LEXIS, News Library, Reuwld File (noting a recent report by
the United Nations' International Labour Organization that 14.4% of India's children aged
10 to 14 are employed). Moreover, recent data from the U.S. Department of State on

human rights practices in India demonstrates that these constitutional protections have not
yet been fully implemented. The State Department included the followin in listing India's
serious human rights abuses: widespread intercaste and communal violence, legal and societal discrimination against women, and widespread exploitation of child labor. U.S. DEP'T
OF STATE, DEP'T OF STATE DISPATCH, INDIA HUM. RTS. PRACICES, 1995 (1996) [hereinafter DEP'T OF STATE DISPATCH].

7. See infra notes 146-48 and accompanying text.
8. d
9. INDIA CONST. pt. III.

10. See infra notes 32-43 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 136-39 and accompanying text.
12. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 173-80 (1803).
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and the ultimate arbiter of the Constitution's meaning. This conception of the judicial role has led the Court to fashion implied limitations on political branch powers that are analogous to the U.S.
Judiciary's approach to the separation of powers. The best known of
these implied limitations, the "basic features limitation," precludes the
Indian Parliament from amending the Constitution in such a way as to
displace its basic features.13
This Article describes the origins of the basic features limitation
and discusses its seeming inconsistency with the Indian framers' narrow view of the Judiciary's role. It begins with a description of the
constitutional provisions of the Indian Judiciary and the long-standing
dispute between the courts and India's Parliament over the Judiciary's
role in India's constitutional democracy.1 4 That dispute has centered
on the Indian Constitution's liberal amendment procedures, which
permit Parliament to amend many portions of the Constitution by
supermajority vote.' This Article chronicles how, in response to various judicial efforts to safeguard constitutionally-protected individual
liberties from parliamentary abrogation, the Indian Parliament repeatedly has used its amendment power to limit the courts' ability to
review legislative acts. The Indian Supreme Court has, in turn, used
devices such as the basic features limitation to restrict Parliament's
ability to amend the Constitution.
After describing the relevant constitutional provisions and the
ongoing dispute between Parliament and the Court, this Article addresses the relationship between the judicial self-conception underlying the basic features limitation and the Indian framers' revolutionary
vision. It asserts that although the Indian courts' imposition of the
basic features limitation is perhaps contrary to a literal reading of the
framers' intent, it is consistent with the framers' objective of freeing
India from a caste-based social system. This Article further asserts
that the judicial self-conception underlying the basic features limita13. This notion is referred to interchangeably in the decisional law and commentary as
the "basic structures doctrine," the "basic features doctrine," and the -essential features

doctrine." For consistency's sake the term "basic features limitation" is uzed herein to
refer to this implied limitation on the Indian Parliament's power to amend the
Constitution.
14. See, e.g., SUNDER RAmAN, Preface to CONSTrTUTIONAL AMENDMEN1T'S IN INDLA:
1950-1989 7 (1989) (noting that the debate has engendered "unending intra-governmental
discord").
15. INDiA CONsT. art. 36S(2). For a description of the Indian constitutional amendment process, which also provides for the amendment of some provisions upon a simple

majority vote by Parliament and for others upon the concurrence of at least one half of the
state legislatures, see infra notes 47-62 and accompanying text.
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tion furthers the framers' reformist objectives by rejecting deeply entrenched social norms that elevate group interests over individual
6
preferences in Indian society.'

H. The Interbranch Dispute Over the Role of
India's Judiciary
A.

Overview of the Indian Constitution

The Indian Constitution, which took effect January 26, 1950,17 establishes a federal government combining elements of the British parliamentary and U.S. constitutional models. 18 India has a tripartite
national government: the Parliament performs the legislative function; 19 the Prime Minister, in consultation with the Council of Ministers, performs the executive function;2 and a unitary Judiciary
performs the judicial function for both the state and national governments.21 India's Constitution is largely silent with respect to local government. Because several members of the Constituent Assembly
favored a decentralized government with power exercised primarily at
the local level, however, the Constitution encourages the creation of
"panchayats," or village councils, to exercise control over local matters.22 The India states' governmental structures mirror that of its na23
tional government.
In addition to structuring the federal and state governments, the
24
Indian Constitution contains explicit individual liberty safeguards,
16. For a related discussion of the role of the Indian Judiciary, see Jamie Cassels, Judicial Activism and Public Interest Litigation in India, 37 Am.J. COMP. L. 495 (1989).
17. See T.K. ToPE,CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF INDIA 1 (2d ed. 1992).

18. Id.at 384. The draft Constitution prepared by the Constituent A,,sembly's drafting
committee borrowed substantially from the British and U.S. models. Sse AUSTIN, supra
note 2, at 34. See also I

CONSTITUENT

ASSErmLY DEBATES 4 (1946) (statement of Chair-

man Sinha noting in his Inaugural Address that the Constituent Assembly would be substantially guided by U.S. constitutional principles).
19. INDIA CONST. arts. 79-88.

20. Id.arts. 52-62 (Presidency) and 74-75 (Council of Ministers). Although the president of India is the titular head of state, he or she does not, in practice, carry out the
executive functions of the national government. See also M.P. JAIN, INDIAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 115 (4th ed. 1987); TOPE, supra note 17, at 384.
21. INDIA CONST. arts. 124-47.
22. INDIA CONST. art. 40. For a discussion of the relationship between the delegates
who favored decentralization and Mohandas Gandhi's beliefs with respect to the structure
of independent India, see AUSTIN, supra note 2, at 28-39.
23. INDIA CONST. pt. VI; see also JAIN, supra note 20, at 159.
24. P.M. BAKSHI, Tr CONSTITUTION OF INDIA: SELECTIVE COMMENTS 2 (1992); AUs.
TIN,

supra note 2, at 50-51.
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which are modeled after the U.S. Constitution's Bill of Rights.s
These safeguards are collectively referred to as the "fundamental
fights" provisions. They include: the guarantee of equality before the
law and equal protection of the laws,2 6 the right to freedom of speech
and assembly,27 the right to life and libertyF8 certain protections related to the practice of religion,29 protection of minority interests,"
and the right to judicial enforcement of the fundamental rights
protections.3 '
B. The ConstitutionalProvisions Giving Rise to the
InterbranchDispute
1.

Provisions Concerningthe Judiciary'sRole in India's
ConstitutionalScheme

The Indian Constitution contains two principal provisions that
ensure compliance with constitutional norms by providing for judicial
supervision of political branch actions. First, Article 13(2) provides:
"The State shall not make any law which takes away or abridges the
rights conferred by [the Constitution's fundamental rights provisions]
and any law made in contravention of this clause shall, to the extent of
the contravention, be void. 3' -2 This provision is understood to permit
the Judiciary to invalidate legislative acts and executive orders? 3 Second, Article 32 expressly guarantees the right to seek judicial enforcement of the Constitution's fundamental rights provisions and
authorizes the Supreme Court to issue writs to compel compliance
with those provisions.34 Article 32 further guarantees the right to
challenge both legislative and executive actions of the state and federal governments.35
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

U.S. CoNsT. amends. I-X.
INDA CONSr. art. 14.
1& art. 19.
Id. art. 21.
Id. arts. 25-28.
IM.arts. 29-30.
Id. art. 32.

32. Id. art. 13(2).

33. See JArN, supra note 20, at 75; BAKSH, supra note 24, at 3 (noting that "[tihe
judiciary has power to declare a law unconstitutional, if the law is found to have contravened any provision of the Constitution.").
34. INDIA CONST. art. 32.

35. Id. art. 32. See id. art. 12 (broadly defining "state" as used in the fundamental
rights provisions to include the national, state, and local governments). See also DuP.GA
DAs BAsu, INTRODUCnON TO THE CONsTrTUo,

OF INMDA 36 (13th ed. 1990).
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The objectives underlying these provisions are clearly discernible
from the Constituent Assembly debates. The record of these debates
is replete with references to the need for a strong Judiciary to protect
individual rights, particularly those of persons subscribing to minority
faiths, from overreaching by the political branches.36 Tie Assembly's
debate concerning Article 32 illustrates this point. None of the speakers who addressed the merits of Article 32 were opposed to affording
a constitutional right of access to the Court for the enforcement of the
fundamental rights provisions.37 Instead, the principal controversy
over Article 32 concerned whether the Constitution should afford the
president the right to suspend enforcement of the fundamental rights
38
provisions in times of emergency.
During the debate, one of the most influential participants in the
Assembly stressed the importance of Article 32. He stated:
If I was asked to name any particular article in this Constitution as
the most important-an article without which this Constitution
would be a nullity-I could not refer to any other article except this
39
one. It is the very soul of the Constitution and the very heart of it.

Virtually every other speaker who addressed the merits of Article 32
expressed similar sentiments. Several noted that without Article 32,
the constitutional protection of fundamental rights would be meaningless.40 Another referred to Article 32 as the most important of the
Constitution's provisions. 4 ' Still others noted that judicial enforcement of the fundamental rights provisions was itself a fundamental
36. Indeed, the Indian Constitution's fundamental rights provision3 include explicit
protections for minority interests. See, e.g., INDIA CONsr. art. 29 (affolding the right to
conserve distinct languages, scripts, and cultures); id. art. 30 (affording linguistic and religious minorities the right to establish and administer educational institutions).
This is not to suggest, of course, that even as originally conceived th Judiciary's powers under Articles 13 and 32 were without limit. For example, the Court's Article 32 powers are expressly limited by Article 34, which concerns periods in which martial law is in
effect, and by Article 359, which suspends judicial enforcement of the fundamental rights
provisions in times of emergency. See INDIA CONST. arts. 32, 34, 359.
37. VII CONSTrrUENT ASSEmBLY DEBATES 930-55 (Dec. 9, 1948).
38. Ia. There was also some discussion of whether the explicit reference to the common law writs was necessary. See id. at 932-33, 952-54.
39. Id. at 953 (statement of Dr. B.R. Ambedkar). See also AUSTIN, supra note 2, at 19
(listing Dr. Ambedkar as one of the twenty most influential participants in the Constituent
Assembly); id. app. II (noting Dr. Ambedkar's chairmanship of the Assembly's Drafting
Committee).
40. VII CONSTITUENT ASSEmBLY DEBATES, supra note 37, at 943 (statement of Prof.
Shibban Lal Saksena); id. at 948 (statement of Shri Rohini Jumar Chaudhari).
41. Id. at 942 (statement of B. Pocker Sahib Bahadur).
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right.42 Moreover, the commentary on the Constitution itself generally asserts that the framers envisioned the courts, and particularly the
Supreme Court, as the protectors of the constitutionally-defined fundamental rights.43
Although the power of Article 13 judicial review generated substantially less discussion during the Constituent Assembly debates
than the provision on judicial enforcement of fundamental rights,4
the judicial review issue was nonetheless viewed as particularly important by several influential members of the Assembly. A member of
the Assembly's Rules Committee stressed that the judicial power to
strike legislative acts on constitutional grounds was necessary if the
courts were to perform effectively their guardianship role.45 Similarly,
a member of both the Rules and Drafting Committees had urged the
Assembly to include an explicit provision for judicial review of legislative actions. Noting that the U.S. courts' power of judicial review was
the product of judicial implication rather than of express constitutional language, he cautioned that this implied power
of review is not
46
a necessary component of a written Constitution.
2. Provisions ConcerningAmendment of the
Indian Constitution
Although the Indian framers sought to ensure the protection of
individual liberties from "the possibility of attack or change which
may be brought about by the passions and vicissitudes of party politics,"47 they also feared that an unduly rigid Constitution would not
survive in India's turbulent political climate. Thus, they opted for a
42. Id at 937 (statement of Shrimati G. Durgabai).
43. In his well-regarded work on the origins of the Indian Constitution, Granville Aus.
tin asserted that the members of the Constituent Assembly approached the shaping of the
provisions relating to the Judiciary with "an idealism equaled only by that shown toward.
the Fundamental Rights." AusTN, supra note 2, at 164. He noted further that the Indian
courts, and particularly the Indian Supreme Court, have a special responsibility to safeguard fundamental rights. Id at 165. See also JAiN, supra note 20, at 125 (-The Supreme
Court has been constituted as the guardian of fundamental rights."); Torz, supra note 17.
at 600 ("Article 13(2) and the elaborate provisions contained in [the jurizdictional and
advisory opinion provisions] indicate the intention of the framers of the Constitution to
confer very wide powers of interpretation on the Supreme Court of India.").
44. VII CONSTITUENT ASSE ?mLY DEBATES, supra note 37, at 611-12, 640-42 and 64346.
45. See Ausm, supra note 2, at 171 (describing statement of K.M. Munshi) and app.
at 342.
46. Id at 171 (describing statement of A.K. Ayyar).
47. VII CONsTrruENT AsshmLY DEBATES, supra note 37, at 938 (statement of J2rome D'Souza).
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flexible Constitution that could be altered with relative ease. 48 This
combination of judicial protection of individual liberttes and parliamentary ability to abrogate constitutional protection of such liberties,
however, set the stage for the interbranch conflict over the scope of
the constitutional powers of the courts and Parliament.
The Indian Constitution sets forth three methods for altering its
text depending upon the type of provision altered. Most provisions of
the Indian Constitution can be amended by a supermajority vote of
Parliament. 49 In order for an amendment to pass, not less than twothirds of the members of each house of Parliament who are present
and voting must vote for passage.50 Several provisions, most of which
relate to federal-state relations, require approval of the state legislatures in addition to a supermajority vote by Parliament. : I In order for
these provisions to be amended, not less than one-half of the Indian
state legislatures must ratify the proposed amendment.52 Thus, even
at its most burdensome, the Indian constitutional amendment process
requires less than the analogous provisions of the U.S. Constitution. 53
Also, the Constitution can be changed in some respects by a simple
majority vote of Parliament.5 4 This procedure applies to those categories of changes that are deemed to be nonamendatory."48. The relative ease with which the Indian Constitution may be amended is perhaps
best demonstrated by the frequency with which its amendment process has been used.
Between its enactment in 1950 and 1991, the Indian Constitution was amended 68 times.
See ToPE, supra note 17, at 571-81 (briefly describing each amendment). By contrast, the
U.S. Constitution has been amended only 27 times in over 200 years. See U.S. CoNST.
amends. I-XXVII.
49. INDIA CONSr. art. 368(2).
50. Id
51. See INDIA CONST. arts. 54 (election of the president), 55 (same), 73 (extent of
union executive power), 162 (extent of state executive power), 241 (high courts of the
union territories), 368 (the constitutional amendment process); pt. XI, ch. I (legislative
relations between state and union governments), pt. V, ch. IV (the union Judiciary), pt. VI,
ch. V (state high courts); pt. XI, ch. I (changes to the lists within the Sev.nth Schedule that
allocates power between the union and state legislatures and establishes some areas of
concurrent jurisdiction, and changes concerning the representation of the states in
Parliament).
52. INDIA CONST. art. 368(2).
53. When state legislative ratification is sought under the U.S. Constitution, threequarters of the states must ratify the amendment in order for it to pass. U.S. CoNST. art. V.
54. For example, Article 4 permits Parliament to change the schedules concerning admission of states to the union and the definition of state boundaries and to make "supplemental, incidental and consequential" provisions without going through the amendment
process. INDIA CONST. art. 4. See also S.P. SATHE, CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS, 1950-

1988: Law and Politics 1 (1989) (describing additional constitutional provisions that can be
altered without compliance with Article 368).
55. INDIA CONST. art. 4.
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The Constituent Assembly Debates indicate that the Assembly
intended this relative ease of amendment to produce a particularly
fluid Constitution 6 The framers sought to create a text that could be
easily amended to accommodate circumstances.-7 Prime Minister
Jawarhalal Nehru, independent India's first Prime Minister and one of
her foremost statesmen ss emphasized this need for flexibility during
the Constituent Assembly debates. He stated:
[W]hile we want this Constitution to be as solid and as permanent a
structure as we can make it, nevertheless there is no permanence in
Constitutions. There should be a certain flexibility ....We should
not make a Constitution such as some other great countries have,
which are so rigid that they do not and cannot be adapted easily to
changing condition [sic]. Today especially, when the world is in turmoil and we are passing through a very swift period of transition,
5s
what we do today may not be wholly applicable to-morrow . 9
Additionally, Prime Minister Nehru stressed that in a representative
democracy, the populace's elected representatives should be free to
60
alter the Constitution as they see fit.
Despite the draft Constitution's liberal amendment provisions,
some participants in the Constituent Assembly favored an even more
flexible constitution. These parties proposed an amendment process
that required only a simple majority vote in Parliament.bl In opposing
this proposed process, Dr. B.R. Ambedkar addressed the dangers of
such a provision, stating that "the purpose of a Constitution is not
merely to create the organs of the State but to limit their authority,
because if no limitation was imposed upon the authority of the organs,
there will be complete tyranny and complete oppression." "'
C. Parliament's Use of Its Amendment Power to Curtail Judicial
Invalidation of Legislative Acts
Shortly after the Indian Constitution's promulgation, Parliament
used the liberal amendment procedures to curtail the Judiciary's ability to safeguard individual liberties. In 1951, Parliament passed the
56. See VII CONSTUENTr ASSErMBLY DEBATES, supra note 37, at 322.23.
57. See, e.g., BAsu, supra note 35, at 34-35.
58. See Alice Jacob, Nehru and the Judiciary, in NERu AND THE CoNsrntmoN,
supra note 2, at 63, 68; AuSTIN, supra note 2,at 18.
59. VII CONSTrrUENT ASSEMBLY DEB.ATES. supra note 37, at 322-23.
60. Ld.
at 323.

61. IX

CONSTrrUENT ASSE.BY DEBATES

62. ld. at 1662.

1642-65.

Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.

[Vol. 20:103

first amendment to the Indian Constitution. 63 The amendment added
Article 31A to the Constitution, which precluded the courts from invalidating certain kinds of agrarian reform legislation on the grounds
that such legislation violated the Constitution's fundamental rights
provisions. 64 Additionally, the amendment added Article 31B, which
precluded the courts from invalidating, on the grounds of inconsistency with the fundamental rights provisions, any legislation that Parliament had placed on Schedule Nine.65 Schedule Nine, one of ten
appendices to the Indian Constitution, initially listed thirteen acts to
be shielded from judicial invalidation on fundamental rights
grounds.6 6 As of 1992, Schedule Nine's protection had been extended
to 257 legislative measures.6 7

Starting with the enactment of the first amendment, Parliament
repeatedly has used its amendment power to limit the Judiciary's ability to perform its guardianship function.68 Perhaps the most extreme
of the parliamentary revisions of the Judiciary's role is contained in
Article 31C, which was added to the Constitution in 1971.69 Article
31C, as originally written, prohibited judicial invalidation of all laws
passed to further two of the general governmental objectives 70 set
forth in Part IV of the Indian Constitution7' on the grounds of inconsistency with three of the Constitution's fundamental rights provisions.72 These objectives, which are extremely general policy goals
63. Constitution Act (First Amendment) § 4 (1951) (India).
64. Id. This provision was subsequently amended to limit its preclusive effect to challenges based on the equal protection and freedom of expression provisions. Constitution
Act (Forty-Fourth Amendment) § 7 (1978) (India). The Indian Constitution's freedom of
expression provision affords protection to a range of activities in addit on to expression,
such as the freedoms to assemble, to associate, to travel within the country, and to engage
in any profession, trade or business. See INDIA CONST. art. 19.
65. Constitution Act (First Amendment) § 5 (1951) (India).
66. TOPE, supra note 17, at 978. From Schedule Nine's inception, th'.legislation listed
thereon has concerned primarily land reform and nationalization of industries. See id. at
990-1002 (containing list of Schedule Nine laws).
67. Id.
68. Indeed, one study concluded that of the 45 constitutional amendments passed between 1950 and 1980,21 sought to limit judicial power in some way. See George Gadbols,
Jr., The Supreme Court of India as a Political Institution, inJUDGES A1ND THE JUDICIAL
POWER 251, 253 (Rajeev Dhavan et al. eds., 1985).
69. Constitution Act (Twenty-Fifth Amendment) § 3 (1971) (India)
70. These objectives included securing the distribution of ownership and control of
resources "as best to subserve the common good" and avoiding the "concentration of
wealth and means of production to the common detriment." INDIA CGNs. art. 39(b)-(c).
71. Constitution Act (Twenty-Fifth Amendment) § 3 (1971) (India).
72. The listed fundamental rights provisions included Article 14 (guaranteeing equality under the law and equal protection), Article 19 (guaranteeing freedom of speech, as-
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rather than judicially enforceable norms, are referred to as directive
principles 73 Article 31C additionally provided that "no law containing a declaration that it is for giving effect to such policy shall be
called in question in any court on the ground that it does not give
effect to such policy." 74 Article 31C thus substantially eviscerated the
Judiciary's power to review national legislation alleged to deprive Indians of certain constitutionally protected interests.
In 1976, the Forty-Second Amendment expanded Article 31C's
preclusive effect.7' The expanded Article 31C precluded judicial76invalidation, on the grounds of two fundamental rights provisions, of
any parliamentary acts that were intended to further any of the Constitution's directive principles. It thus insulated the legislative process
from the judicial supervision necessary to give effect to Article 13(2)
whenever the Parliament purported to act in furtherance of any of the
general, non-justiciable objectives identified as directive principles. In
part as a consequence of its broad preclusive effect, portions of Article
31C were eventually invalidated by the Indian Supreme Court.77
D. The JudicialResponse to ParliamentaryAbrogation of its
GuardianshipRole
In 1967, after nearly two decades of the incremental erosion of its
constitutional powers by Parliament, the Supreme Court attempted to
regain lost ground in a case concerning the scope of Parliament's
power to amend the Constitution. In the controversial Golak Nath v.
State of Punjab decision,7s the Court read a limitation into Article
368's seemingly absolute grant of power to Parliament to unilaterally
amend most portions of the Constitution. It did so by construing Artisembly, movement, and the practice of any trade, profession, or business), and Article 31

(limiting the compulsory acquisition of property). See INDIA Cosr. art. 31C. Article 31
was repealed by Parliament in 1978. See Constitution Act (Forty-Fourth Amendment) § 6

(1978).
73. The Indian Constitution's directive principles provisions were modeled on Article
45 of the Irish Constitution. ToPE, supra note 17, at 335. The Indian government is required to apply these directive principles in making laws. INDIA CoNsr. art. 37.
74. INDIA CONST.art. 31C
75. Constitution Act (Forty-Second Amendment) § 4 (1976).
76. The two provisions are set forth in Articles 14 and 19. For a description of these
provisions, see supra notes 26-31 and accompanying text.
77. See infra notes 78-122 and accompanying text.
78. Golak Nath v. State of Punjab, A..R 1967 S.C. 1645. Golak Nath was controversial not only because of its holding, but also because it overruled the Court's earlier resolution of the question at hand in Shankari Prasadv. Union of India, A.LR. 1951 S.C. 453.
Golak Nath, A.I.RL 1967 S.C. at 1670.
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cle 13(2), which provides for judicial invalidation of laws that are inconsistent with the Constitution's fundamental rights provisions, to
apply to acts of Parliament that amend the Constitution. The Golak
Nath plurality reasoned that Article 13(2) provided for the judicial
invalidation of any "law" that is inconsistent with the fundamental
rights provisions, and that legislation which purports to amend the
Constitution falls within the definition of "law." 7 9 It declined to differentiate between measures taken by Parliament in its legislative capacity and those taken in its constituent capacity. 0 Thus, under
Golak Nath, purported constitutional amendments that infringed
upon the Constitution's fundamental rights provisions were subject to
judicial invalidation.8 ' One member of the panel asserted that the
proper procedure for altering the fundamental rights provisions was to
call a new constituent assembly to prepare a new Constitution.8 In
response to Golak Nath, Parliament amended Article 13 to include a
provision stating that nothing in the Article applies to "any amend''
ment of this Constitution made under Article 368. 83
Parliament's efforts to legislatively overrule Golak Nath were reviewed by the Indian Supreme Court in Kesavananda Bharati v. State
of Kerala. 4 In that case, the plaintiffs challenged several constitutional amendments alleged to interfere with constitutionally-protected
fundamental rights. However, plaintiffs also challenged the constitutionality of the portion of the Twenty-Fourth Amendment that attempted to reverse the Golak Nath holding and the portion of the
Twenty-Fifth Amendment that insulated from judicial invalidation on
certain grounds laws passed to further India's directive principles.
The Kesavananda Court unanimously voted both to overrule Golak Nath's conclusion that constitutional amendments were subject to
judicial invalidation under Article 13(2) and to uphold the constitutionality of the Twenty-Fourth Amendment."5 It may be, however,
that like the U.S. executive branch in Marbury v. Madison,8 6 Parlia79. Golak Nath, A.I.R. 1967 S.C. at 1658-60.
80. Id

81. Because various amendments passed prior to the Golak Nath decision had altered
the fundamental rights provisions, the Court's holding in Golak Nath was only prospective.
Id at 1669.
82. Id. at 1705 (Hidayatullah, J.).
83. Constitution Act (TWenty-Fourth Amendment) § 2 (1971) (India). Article 368 was
also amended to include an analogous provision. See id. § 3.
84. Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala, A.I.R. 1973 S.C. 1461. The Kesavananda
decision was issued by a special bench that consisted of 13 justices. Id. at 1461.
85. Kesavananda, A.I.R. 1973 S.C. at 1462.
86. Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 137.
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ment won the battle but lost the warP 7 A majority of the Kesavananda Court read a substantial implied limitation into Parliament's
constitutional amendment power. The majority concluded that
although Parliament's amendment powers extend to all segments of
the Constitution, including those relating to fundamental rights, the
amendment provision does not permit the alteration of the Constitution's basic structure or its essential features& In so holding, the
Court established the basic features limitation.
The seven justices who adopted the basic features limitation set
forth their views in a series of separate opinions. In the most detailed
of the explanatory statements, Chief Justice Sikri specifically addressed the issue of whether a constitutional text may be subject to
implied limitations. Relying heavily on case law from other jurisdictions, including Chief Justice Marshall's opinion in McCulloch v
Maryland,s9 he concluded that such implied limitations can exist:,'He then construed the term "amendment," as used in Article 368, to
be limited to "any addition or change in any of the provisions of the
Constitution within the broad contours of the Preamble and the Constitution to carry out the objectives in the Preamble and the Directive
Principles." 91
Thus, although Chief Justice Sikri rejected Golak Nath's per se
preclusion of amendments to the fundamental rights provisions, he
concluded that Parliament's power to amend those provisions is impliedly limited by the Constitution's "broad contours.""-' He stated
that "[a]pplied to fundamental rights, it would mean that while fundamental rights cannot be abrogated reasonable abridgments of fundamental rights can be effected in the public interest." 9- The opinion
87. The U.S. Supreme Court in Marbury avoided a direct confrontation vith President
Jefferson by concluding that under Article III the Court could not exercise original jurisdiction over the claim asserted by Mr. Marbury. Id. at 169-73. In the course of reaching
this result, however, it established for itself the authority to pass on the constitutionality of
the acts of the political branches. Id. at 173-SO. One commentator has thus referred to
Marbury as putting the Court "in the delightful position.., of rejecting and assuming
power in a single breath." ROBERT G. MCCLOSKEY, THE ArmsEmcAN SUPRE.iE CauRt 42
(1960).
88. Kesavananda,A.I.R. 1973 S.C. at 1462.
89. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). In McCulloch, the Court
used both a broad reading of the necessary and proper clause and statements concerning
the nature of constitutional interpretation to set the stage for a broad interpretation of the
exercise of powers granted to the national government. Id.
90. Kesavananda, A.I.R. 1973 S.C. at 1534.
91. Id. at 1535.
92. Id.
93. Id.
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does not, however, address how the courts are to differentiate between abrogation and "reasonable abridgments." Chief Justice Sikri,
presumably anticipating charges of Lochnerism, further noted, "The
Courts will not be concerned with the wisdom of the amendment." 94
Several other opinions in Kesavananda accepted the basic features limitation but cited to the difference between amendment and
repeal in the constitutional context. Two opinions asserted that the
use of the term "amendment" in Article 368 afforded a lesser power
than that of repeal, and from this distinction drew the basic features
limitation. 95
In the opinions that adopted the basic features liaitation, there
was some disagreement with respect to what constitutes the basic features of the Indian Constitution. 96 Chief Justice Sikri's opinion asserted that "[t]he basic structure may be said to consist of the
following features: (1) Supremacy of the Constitution; (2) Republican
and Democratic forms of Government; (3) Secular character of the
Constitution; (4) Separation of powers between the legislature, the executive and the judiciary; [and] (5) Federal character of the Constitution." 97 Justices Hegde and Mukherjea's opinion stated:
Parliament has no power to abrogate or emasculate the basic elements or Fundamental features of the Constitution such as the sovereignty of India, the democratic character of our policy, the unity
of the country, the essential features of the individual freedoms secured to the citizens. Nor has the Parliament the power to revoke
the mandate to build a Welfare State and egalitarian98society. These
limitations are only illustrative and not exhaustive.
Finally, Justice Khanna took a narrower view of the limitation,
suggesting that it applies only to the governmental structures established by the Constitution and not to any substantive protections.99 A
majority of the Court did agree, however, that the latter portion of
Article 31C, which precludes challenges to legislation on the grounds
that it does not give effect to the directive principles cited by Parlia94. 1d.
95. Id. at 1776 (Reddy, J.); Id. at 1859-60 (Khanna, J.).

96. See Minerva Mills, Ltd. v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1980 S.C. 1789, 1820-21
(Bhagwati, J., dissenting) (summarizing the positions taken by the Kesavananda majority
on what constitutes the Indian Constitution's basic features).
97. Kesavananda, A.I.R. 1973 S.C. at 1535.
98. Id. at 1628.
99. Id. at 1860.
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ment, was invalid as inconsistent with this implied limitation on displacing the Constitution's basic structure.10
Following Kesavananda's articulation of the basic features limitation on Parliament's amendatory powers, Parliament renewed its efforts to exclude the Judiciary from the constitutional amendment
process. In 1976, Parliament passed the Forty-Second Amendment
Act' 01 that added two clauses to Article 368. Clause (4) states that
"[n]o amendment of this Constitution (including the provisions of Part
III) made or purporting to have been made under this article [whether
before or after the commencement of section 55 of the Constitution
(Forty-Second Amendment) Act, 1976] shall be called in question in
any court on any ground."' 02 Clause (5) states that "there shall be no
limitation whatever on the constituent power of Parliament to amend
...the provisions of this Constitution ... ."103 Although Parliament
later repealed much of the Forty-Second Amendment, these two provisions remain in the Constitution.
In Minerva Mills, Ltd. v. Union of India, a five judge panel of the
Court addressed the constitutionality of the Forty-Second Amendment's two additions to Article 368.104 The panel unanimously opted
to strike both provisions as unconstitutional on the grounds that they
impermissibly sought to alter one of the Constitution's basic features.
In his majority opinion, Justice Chandrachud asserted that upholding
the purported Article 368 amendment would permit Parliament to impermissibly expand its own limited amendment powers."" He argued
that the Constitution did not permit Parliament to use its amendatory
power to remove the implied basic features limitation articulated by
the Kesavananda Court. 0 6 Justice Chandrachud also relied upon the
separation of functions principle in striking that portion of the purported amendment that expressly precluded the courts from hearing
claims relating to the amendment process. 10 7 In a separate opinion,
Justice Bhagwati, referring to Parliament's action as "a case of zeal
over-running discretion," concluded that the two attempted Article
368 additions were unconstitutional on basic features grounds. "J He
100. ld. at 1462.

101. Constitution Act (Forty-Second Amendment) § 55 (1976) (India).
102.
103.
104.
105.

Id. cl.
5.
Id.
Minerva Mills, A.IR. 19S0 S.C. at 1789.
Id. at 1798-99.

106. Id
107. Id at 1799.

108. Id at 1823-27.
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reasoned that all governmental power under the Indian Constitution
is limited and circumscribed by the text of the Constitution. 10 9 To preclude judicial review of constitutional amendments would afford Parliament unlimited power. 110 He then set forth a conception of the
Judiciary's role in India's constitutional scheme reminiscent of Chief
Justice Marshall's opinion in Marbury v. Madison,"' stating:
It is a cardinal principle of our Constitution that no one howsoever
highly placed and no authority however lofty can claim to be the
sole judge of its power under the Constitution or whether its action
is within the confines of such power laid down by the Constitution.
The judiciary is the interpreter of the Constitution and to the judiciary is assigned the delicate task to determine what is the power conferred on each branch of Government, whether it is limited, and if
so, what are the limits and whether any action of that branch transgresses such limits. It is for the judiciary to uphold the constitutional values and to enforce the constitutional limitations. 11

Over Justice Bhagwati's dissent, the Minerva Mills Court also invalidated the Forty-Second Amendment's expansion of Article 31C's
preclusionary effect."13 The Court reasoned that such an expansion
was inconsistent with the Constitution's basic structure.11 The abovedescribed Article 31C originally precluded judicial invalidation of legislation intended by Parliament to further certain of the Constitution's
directive principles." 5 The Forty-Second amendment drastically expanded Article 31C's scope, precluding judicial invalidation of legislation intended to further any of the Constitution's directive
principles. 1 6 Writing for the majority, Justice Chandrachud noted
that the framers sought a balance between the individual liberties protected by the fundamental rights provisions of Part III and the social
reform objectives articulated in Part IV's directive principles. 117 He
concluded that the challenged portion of the Forty-Second amendment impermissibly disrupted this balance by elevating the furtherance of the directive principles over the preservation of individual
109. Id.
110. itt
111. Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 137.
112. Minerva Mills, A.I.R. 1980 S.C. at 1825. This theme is reitcrated in Justice
Bhagwati's concurrence in the more recent Sampath Kumar decision. Sampath Kumar v.
Union of India, A.I.R. 1987 S.C. 386, 388-89.
113. Minerva Mills, A.I.R. 1980 S.C. at 1806-11.
114. ld.

115. See supra notes 68-77 and accompanying text.
116. Constitution Act (Forty-Second Amendment) § 4 (1976) (India),
117. Minerva Mills, A.I.R. 1980 S.C. at 1806-11.
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liberties." 8 This was inconsistent with the basic features limitation.' 19
Justice Bhagwati in his dissent also considered the framers' intentions
with respect to the relationship between the fundamental rights and
directive principles provisions, but concluded that Article 31C as
amended was consistent with the framers' objectives of preserving individual liberties while furthering certain social goals. 1' He did not
reject the application of the basic features limitation to this problem,
but simply concluded that rather than harming the Constitution's basic structure, the amendment "strengthens and re-enforces" it.'12
Although the debate among the Justices concerning what constitutes
the Indian Constitution's basic features continues, the Court repeatedly has affirmed the existence of this implied limitation on Parliament's authority."
E. Conclusion
The foregoing, rather than exhaustively cataloguing the Indian
Parliament's efforts to limit judicial invalidation of political branch actions and the Judiciary's responses, merely summarizes the principal
developments in the constitutional amendment process.'2 It illustrates the considerable tension, inherent in the Indian framers' vision,
between a liberal amendment process designed to promote political
and social reforms and a Judiciary that takes seriously its role as the
guardian of individual liberties. The Indian Supreme Court, in an ef118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 1842-57.
121. Id. at 1853.

122. See, e.g., Srinivasa Raghavachar v. State of Karnataka, A.IR. 19S7 S.C. 1518, 1525;
Sampath Kumar v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1987 S.C. 386, 395-96 (conclusory anayses presupposing the validity of the basic features limitation); Sanjeev Coke Mfg. Co. v. M!5.
Bharat Coking Coal Ltd., A.I.Rt 1983 S.C. 239, 246-48 (criticizing the Court's manner of
applying the basic features limitation in Minerva Mills but not questioning the limitation's
validity); Waman Rao v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1981 S.C. 271 (assessing the constitutionality of Articles 31A, 31B, and 31C under the basic features doctrine); Indira Gandhi v. Raj

Narain, A.I.LR 1975 S.C. 2299, 2355, 2472 (invalidating constitutional amendment regarding the electoral process in the view of some justices on basic features grounds).

123. In addition to its incremental erosion of the judicial power, the Indian Parliament
occasionally has sought more sweeping reform. Indeed, much of the Forty-Second

Amendment, through which the Congress Party in 1976 under the leadership of Prime
Minister Indira Gandhi sought a comprehensive restructuring of the Indian government,

concerned the role of the Judiciary. Many of its reforms, however, were removed from the
Constitution shortly thereafter when the Congress Party lost control of Parliament folloxring the 1977 elections. See Constitution Act (Forty-Third Amendment) (1977) (India);

Constitution Act (Forty-Fourth Amendment) (1978) (India). See also S.,AXmE, supra note
54, at 29-51.
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fort to preserve its guardianship role, has employed several measures
to limit Parliament's ability to displace its oversight function. After
imposing and later rejecting a per se limitation on parliamentary abrogation of the fundamental rights provisions, the Court articulated the
basic features limitation. Under this doctrine, the Court has impliedly
limited Parliament's amendment power so as to p:reclude those
amendatory measures that would destroy the Constitution's basic features or structure. Although there is considerable uncertainty with
respect to precisely what constitutes the Constitution's basic features
and structure, the limitation's existence is well established in the case
law.
I1. Judicial Self-Conception Within the Indian
Constitutional Framework
A.

The Indian Judiciary's Self-Conception Is Wholly Consistent
with the Framer's Reformist Vision

Implicit in the Indian Supreme Court's basic features limitation is
a particularly American conception of the judicial function. Courts are
free to read implicit limitations into constitutional texts so as to limit
the exercise of powers expressly afforded to political actors. The Indian federal courts thus act as the protectors of individual autonomy
by performing a supervisory function with respect to the political
branches. This conception of the U.S. federal Judiciary's role is directly traceable to Marbury v. Madison.24 Marbury is relevant here
in two respects. First, the Marbury Court not only established for itself the power to review the actions of the political brarnches, 125 it did
so with relatively little textual support.126 By adopting this power, the
Court rendered itself the ultimate arbiter of the Constitution's meaning.127 Second, the Court in Marbury styled the federal courts as the
protectors of individual autonomy from political brancb interference.
Chief Justice Marshall's opinion asserted that because the U.S. government is one "of laws and not of men," legal remedies must be
available for legal wrongs. 12 This vision of the judicial task set the
stage for a series of decisions over nearly two centuries in which the
Court has construed the constitutional text so as to protect individuals
124.
125.
126.
127.

Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 137.
Id. at 178-80.
Id. at 173-80.
Id.

128. Id. at 163.
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from political aggression. 29 Thus, the dismantling of a racially segregated education system,130 the providing of substantial procedural
safeguards in criminal proceedings, 13 1 and the protection of reproductive decision making from state interference13 2 are Marbury's
progeny.
Like the conception implicit in the Indian Supreme Court's basic
features limitation cases, the U.S. Supreme Court's role in the constitutional scheme permits it to articulate implied limitations on political
branch powers. For example, the U.S. Supreme Court, on occasion,
invalidates political branch actions on separation of powers
grounds. 33 In those cases, the Court relies on judicially established
limits on express constitutional terms to curtail perceived political
branch overreaching.'- The Indian Supreme Court, without expressly relying on this U.S. precedent, followed this approach in the
basic features limitation cases by establishing implicit limitations on
Parliament's express constitutional powers, ostensibly to maintain the
balance of power contemplated by the Constitution's framers. However, the protection of individual autonomy through both judicial
preservation of express constitutional rights and judicial limitation on
political branch aggression may be inconsistent with the Indian framers' vision of the judicial role. The Constituent Assembly Debates
suggest that the concept of individual liberty is more narrowly understood in the Indian constitutional context than in the U.S. constitutional context. Thus, although much of the rhetoric in the Constituent
Assembly on the importance of the Judiciary's guardianship role was
129. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL Lw%4-5 (2d ed. 1933)
(noting that the federal Judiciary used structural constitutional safeguards to fashion -judicially enforceable guarantees for vested rights and for the interest in having government

proceed in accord with settled rules of law").
130. See, eg., Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 4,3 (1954).
131. See, eg., Gideon v. Vainwight, 372 U.S. 335,344 (1963) (construing the Constitution to require the appointment of counsel at state expense for those accused of felonies);
Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 3S3, 398 (1914) (establishing the exclusionary rule with
respect to federal criminal proceedings); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961) (extending exclusionary rule to state criminal proceedings).

132. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Griswold v. Connecticut, 331 U.S. 479
(1965). But see Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 492 U.S. 490 (19S9) (curtailing
the constitutional protection articulated in Roe v. Wade).
133. See, eg., Bowsher v. Synar, 47S U.S. 714, 721-27 (19S6) (striking portion of
Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act); Youngstovn Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer. 343 U.S. 579,
585-89 (1952) (invalidating President Truman's seizure of steel mills during labor unrest).
See also id. at 634-55 (Jackson, J., concurring).

134. l
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stated in absolute terms,' 35 the framers' vision of the Judiciary's role
was rather limited. Indeed, the record suggests that the Indian framers intended the courts to preserve individual liberties only where
such preservation did not interfere with certain social reform
objectives.
Prime Minister Jawarhalal Nehru explicitly articulated this limited vision of the judicial role during the Constituent Assembly debates. 36 It was Prime Minister Nehru's vision of the Judiciary's role
in the Indian constitutional scheme that largely shaped the approach
taken by the Constituent Assembly. 137 Although a strong and independent Judiciary was central to this vision, Prime Minister Nehru
presupposed that the courts' guardianship function would be curtailed
by India's need for drastic social and economic reform, particularly
with respect to land ownership. Thus, for example, while individual
rights were to be afforded great weight and protected by the Judiciary,
those rights were, by necessity, circumscribed to a certain extent by
the need for land reform. 38 Others expressed this tempered view of
the judicial role during the debates. One delegate, for example,
warned that while judicial independence is important, the framers had
to ensure that the Judiciary did not become "a kind :?super-legislature or super-executive." '39
Granville Austin's political history of the promulgation of the Indian Constitution supports the view that the framers understood the
Judiciary's guardianship role to be limited by the need for certain social reforms. Austin notes that while several distinct goals informed
the framing of the Indian Constitution, the goal of achieving a fundamental restructuring of Indian society was transcendent. 140 Moreover,
135.
136.
137.
138.

See, e.g., supra notes 39-43.
IX CONSTITUENT ASSE~mLY DEBATES, supra note 61, at 1191, 1195-96.
See Jacob, supra note 58, at 65.
Id.at 68-73. For a more general discussion of the land reform issue, see Moham-

mad Ghouse, Nehru and Agrarian Reforms, in NEHRU AND THE CONsT=nx=ON, supra note

2, at 77-109.
139. XI CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY DEBATES 837 (Nov. 23, 1949) (,;tatement of A.K.
Ayyar).
140. AuST'N, supra note 2, at xi. See also id. at 26-27 (quoting K. Santhanam, a promi-

nent member of the Constituent Assembly, as identifying the framers' task to be the removal of India from "medievalism based on birth, religion, custom, and community and
[the] reconstruct[ion of] her social structure on modern foundations of law, individual
merit, and secular education"); BAKSHI, supra note 24, at 2:
The framers of the Constitution were keen to preserve the demociatic values to
which Indians had attached the highest importance in their struggle for freedom.
But they were also keen to make provisions considered to be necessary in the

light of the social and economic backwardness of certain sections of society.
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he attributes the Indian framers' simultaneous empowerment of the
courts to protect individual liberties and the curtailment of that role to
the fact that the relevant provisions "were drafted in the name of the
social revolution."''
Indeed, despite the Indian Supreme Court's efforts to preserve
the Judiciary's guardianship function, this tempered view of the significance of individual liberties protection in the constitutional scheme
appears in some Court decisions. For example, in the seminal Kesavananda decision, 42 although two Justices took issue with how Parliament had struck the balance between individual liberties and social
reform in a given instance, they recognized the framers' intention to
provide for widespread social reform while providing some protection
for individual liberties. 143 Justice Bhagwati made the point more
forcefully in his separate opinion in Minerva Mills.'" Rejecting the
argument that Parliament had impermissibly curtailed the Judiciary's
ability to safeguard fundamental rights, he asserted that, while the
protection of such rights is "no doubt important and valuable in a democracy," a true democracy cannot exist unless the social equality
goals articulated elsewhere in the Constitution are first realized. 4 This vision of the judicial role as limited by the need for certain
social reforms is also reflected in the Constituent Assembly's response
in the face of legal challenges to social reform legislation in the early
years of Indian independence. Shortly after the Indian Constitution
took effect, a number of land reform measures were challenged in the
lower courts on fundamental rights grounds. 46 Before the Supreme
Court had the opportunity to review the lower courts' decisions, the
Constituent Assembly, sitting as a provisional Parliament, amended
the Constitution to limit the Judiciary's ability to strike land reform
legislation on individual liberties grounds. 47 The Assembly thereby
141. AusrIN, supra note 2, at 174.

142. Kesavananda, A.LR. 1973 S.C. 1461.
143. See id.
at 1628-29 (Hegde & Mukherjea, JJ.) (discussing courts' guardianship role
with respect to individual liberties under a Constitution that anticipates extensive s&ial
change).
144. Minerva Mills, A.LR 19S0 S.C. at 1842-57.
145. Id.
at 1847 (Bhagwati, J.,
dissenting). The social equality goals are contained in the
Constitution's directive principles provisions. IrNDIA CoN sr. art. 38. For a deScription of
these provisions, see supra notes 68-74 and accompanying text.
146. SATmE, supra note 54, at 9-10.

147. These reforms were contained in the Frst Amendment Act, discussed supra notes
63-65 and accompanying text.
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reaffirmed its acceptance of Prime14Minister
Nehru's limited vision of
8
the courts' guardianship function.
The Indian framers' desire both to provide some protection for
individual liberties and to ensure substantial social reform was perhaps inevitable and certainly understandable, considering the context
in which the Indian Constitution was drafted. The Constituent Assembly had been in existence for six months when, after nearly one
hundred years of direct British rule and hundreds of years of British
domination of the Indian subcontinent, Britain announced that beginning on August 15,1947 it would recognize both India's and Pakistan's
sovereignty. 49 The decision to partition British India into separate,
predominantly Hindu and Muslim independent states triggered rioting, killing, and the displacement of millions during the constitutional
drafting process. 5 In the two months following the announcement of
the partition decision, ten million persons were rendered homeless
and nearly one-half million were killed in communal violence. 151 Austin describes the immediate impact of this disruption on the Constituent Assembly as follows:
Pilgrim trains were attacked within twenty miles of Delhi and fifty
persons killed. Other killings took place in New Delhi, less than a
mile from where the Constituent Assembly would meet. This tide
of murderous passion would ebb and flow for more than a year,
finally receding only in the late autumn of 1947. Partition forced on
independent India administrative readjustment on a grand scale and
presented North India with six million refugees, many of whom filled camps in Old Delhi or set up vegetables stalls [sic] in New Delhi
within shouting distance of the Constituent Assembly chamber.
148. The commentary supports the view that these changes were made shortly after the
Constitution's adoption because a literal acceptance of the Judiciary's role as guardian of
fundamental rights posed a barrier to the passage of "social and economic reconstruction"
legislation, particularly with respect to the redistribution of land. See, e.g., SAi-w, supra
note 54, at 7-11, 15. See also Waman Rao, A.I.R. 1981 S.C. at 271, 281-35 (describing the
first amendment as an effort by the central government to end litigation cver early agrarian
reform legislation).
149. See AUSTIN, supra note 2, at 8. For a brief history of the era of British control of
the Indian subcontinent, see generally GEOFFREY MOORHOUSE, INDIA BtITANNICA 28-127
(1983).
150. Between 1947 and 1950, an estimated 17 million people migrated as a consequence
of partition. See O.H.K. SPATE & A.T.A. LEARMONTH, INDIA AND PAKISTAN: A GENERAL AND REGIONAL GEOGRAPHY

119-20 (3d ed. 1967).

151. See M.J. AKBAR, RIOT AFTER RIOT 10 (1991). For a detailed account of the communal violence leading up to and following partition, see GOPAL DAS KHOSLA, STERN
RECKONING: A SURVEY OF THE EvENTs LEADING UP TO AND FOLLOWING THE PARTITION
OF INDIA (1989).
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Tension increased in New Delhi with the arrival of the refugees. Rioting and bloodshed began in late August 1947; Assembly members
attending the fifth session had to have special curfew passes to enable them to get to the Assembly. As late as November that year,
Muslim Assembly
members requested special protection while in
152
New Delhi.

Austin cites these circumstances to explain the framers' perception that India needed a strong central government.15 3 These conditions also may explain the framers' desire both for the protection of
individual liberties, particularly of religious and linguistic minorities,
and for a flexible constitutional text that would permit amendment
with relative ease.'1 4 Thus, although the Indian framers envisioned a
Judiciary that would safeguard individual liberties, their view of this
judicial function was limited both by India's compelling need for social reforms and by the divisive historical circumstances under which
the Constitution was drafted.Y5
In addition to this circumscribed notion of constitutional protection of individual rights, the Indian framers expected that the Consti152. AusTrIN, supra note 2, at 44 (footnotes omitted).
153. Id.
154. The social conditions that gave rise to these somewhat conflicting objectives have
not wholly disappeared in the years since Indian independence. For an anecdotal account
of communal and caste-based violence in Independent India, see AKnAr, supra note 151:
4.1 PAUL R. BRASS, THE NEW'CAMBRIDGE HisroRY OF INDIA: THE POLITICS OF INDIA
SINcE INDEENDENCE 198 (1990) (table noting incidents of communal violence and
number of persons killed between 1954 and 1932). See also DExVT OF STATE DisPmcAT ,
supra note 6.
155. In contrast, the U.S. courts' preoccupation with individual rights isconsistent with
at least one central tenet underlying the U.S. form of government: the protection of individual autonomy from governmental interference. See TRIE,supra note 129. at 2-3 (noting that the U.S. framers' primary objective was to preserve individual liberty through
decentralization of power). See also Louis Du,.-or, Ho!.io HIERARCHicus 237 (1971)
[hereinafter Dum.soNyr, HIERARCHICUS (referring to the United States as -the most extreme
individualistic environment"). Although considerable debate exists with respect to the intellectual origins of the U.S. Constitution, at the very least a Lockean conception of individual liberty was part of that vision. See eg., DANIE. A. FARBER & SUZANNA SHERV,
A HISTORY OF THE AhfERICAN CoNsTriuroN 3-5 (1990); BERNARD BA.',LN, THE IDEO.
LOGICAL ORIGINS OF TH ArmaCAN REVOLLUTION 26-30,53-54 (1967) (referring to Locke
in stating that a blend of "[e]nlightenment abstractions and common law precedents, covenant theology and classical analogy" forms the ideological origins of the American Revolution). Locke in his political wvritings rejected the notion that absolute monarchy is the bast
form of civil government, favoring instead a social contract theory under which autonomous individuals opt to form communities and agree to be ruled by majority determinations. Locke's justification for this view rested in part upon his conclusion that the
principal human traits in the state of nature are liberty and equality. See JOHN LocKE,
Two TREATIsEs OF GoVERmENT 285-346 (Peter Laslett ed., 2d ed. 1967) (16S9). See also
FRANK THiLLY & LEDGER WOOD, A HISTORY OF PHILOSOPuY 349-52 (1957).
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tution would be altered in response to political circumstances.1 5 6
Nothing in the Constituent Assembly debates suggests that the liberal
amendment principles would be inapplicable to the Constitution's individual liberties provisions. Indeed, considering the framers' expectation that the Judiciary would take account of India's need for social
reform in enforcing the fundamental rights provisions, it seems unlikely that they would have intended to render the fundamental rights
provisions immune from alteration in response to political needs.
Both the framers' vision of the scope of the Judiciary's guardianship function and the liberal amendment procedure might suggest that
the Indian Supreme Court's conception of its role is al odds with the
framers' reformist vision. Under this view, the regard for individual
autonomy reflected in the Court's conception of the judicial role
would seem to be contrary to the framers' goal of reforming Indian
society from one of caste-based and religious-based norms to one
based on more egalitarian principles. This conclusion would stem,
however, from too narrow an understanding of the Indian framers'
objectives. Although the framers perceived a short-term need to limit
the scope of individual liberties in order to ensure social progress,
their ultimate objective was to create a society in which an individual's
circumstances would not be determined by such factors as caste or
class origins. The Court's efforts to maintain the Judiciary's guardianship role with respect to individual liberties and to limit political
branch overreaching may thus reflect the evolution of Indian constitutional law. Namely, it has moved from its early emphasis on altering
the status of previously disadvantaged groups to a more individual
rights-based vision of the relationship between government and those
subject to its mandates. The Indian Judiciary's protection of individual liberties through the development of the basic features limitation
is, therefore, better viewed as being fully consistent with the framers'
ultimate objective of reorganizing Indian society upon more egalitarian, merit-based lines.
B.

The Indian Judiciary's Conception of Its Role Furthers the
Framers' Objectives by Rejecting Well-Established
Social Norms That Limit Individual Choice
and Autonomy

In addition to being consistent with the revolutionary goals underlying the Indian Constitution, the conception of the judicial role
156. See supra notes 49-55 and accompanying text.
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underlying the basic features limitation may in fact further those goals
by helping to reshape the Indian public's conception of the relationship between the individual and society. As Marc Galanter noted in
his seminal work on the relationship between law and society in India,
a substantial disparity exists between legal and social norms in India.157 The Court's rights-based conception of its role under the Indian Constitution could serve to lessen that disparity and further the
framers' reformist objectives by shifting the emphasis in Indian society
from group status to individual preference.
The elevation of group status over individual preference in India
has been widely discussed. In Homo Hierarchicus,a classic work on
the ideology of India's caste system, French sociologist Louis Dumont
identified hierarchy as the "fundamental social principle" underlying
the notion of caste5ss He contrasted this Indian reliance on hierarchy
with the West's invocation of "moral and political egalitarianism" as
its fundamental organizing principle. 5 9 With respect to caste, Dumont explained that hierarchy relates not to power,"I' but instead to
ordering based on the concepts of purity and impurity. 16' In contrast
to India's reliance on hierarchy as its organizing principle, Western
cultures, in Dumont's view, organize themselves according to the cardinal principles of equality and liberty. 1 2 He noted that these two
values "assume as their common principle, and as a valorized representation, the idea of the human individual....."161 Dumont's analysis thus suggests that differing conceptions of the relationship between
157. See generally MARC GALANTER, LAW & SOCIET IN MODEMN INDIA IRajeev
Dhavan ed., 19S9).

158. Duiorr, HiERARcHiCUS, supra note 155, at 2. See also CJ. FutaEn, THE CAMPHOR FLArm: POPULAR HINDuIsM AND SOCIETY IN INDIA 4

(1992) (identif ving -hierarchi-

cal inequality" as a fundamental principle of Hindu religion and society).
159. DuMoN-r, HmRARCOiCUS, supra note 155, at 2. Dumont does not, of course, suggest that hierarchy is lacking in Western society or that individualism is wholly absent from
Indian society. Rather, he asserts that egalitarianism and hierarchy are given particular
emphasis in the respective cultures. See Louis DuMO,, FRO.i MANDEV ILLE TO MAP% 35 (1977) [hereinafter Durow, MARX].
160. DuMoNr, HmiEARCHicus, supra note 155, at 65.
161. Id. at 42-61, 66.

162. Id. These are the characteristics identified by Locke as appertaining to humans in
the state of nature. See Locke, supra note 155 at 285-346.
163. DuMoNT, HiERARmcHCUS, supra note 155, at 4. Dumont further explores the contrasting Indian reliance on hierarchy as its organizing principle with Western indihidualism.
DuM~oNr, MARX, supra note 159, at 3-5. See also CoNcEprs OF PEnsON: KINSHIP, CASTE,
AND MARRIAGE IN INDIA (1982) (Akos Ostor et al. eds., 1982) (draving on Dumont's
analysis in exploring the concept of the person in Indian society).
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the individual and society may underlie the U.S. and Indian
Constitutions.
A range of Indian customs and social institutions supports Dumont's conclusions and suggests that, contrary to the normative values
underlying the U.S. Constitution, group identity and group advantage
are routinely given priority over individual autonomy and personal
preference in India. 1" Foremost in any assessment of whether the
normative values underlying the Indian Constitution elevate group
identity and advantage over individual autonomy are the related
Hindu notions of varna and caste.1 65 These notions are highly significant for two reasons. First, they are the bases upon which Hindu society historically has organized itself.166 Second, varna and caste, by
definition, devalue individual autonomy by limiting individual choice.
Varna divides Hindus into four orders with broadly defined responsibilities: Brahmin (priests and scholars); Kshatriya (rulers and
soldiers); Vaishya (merchants); and Shudra (peasants, laborers, and
servants). 167 From these broad categories, the subgroups known as
castes and their subgroups, known as subcastes, are drawn. The group
164. See DUMONT, HIERARCHICUS, supra note 155.

165. Caste is of particular significance in any consideration of Indian social structures
because a substantial majority of the Indian population is Hindu. According to the 1981
Indian census, Hindus constitute roughly 83% of the country's population. INIA 1990: A
REFERENCE ANNUAL 14 (Research & Reference Div., Indian Ministry of Info. & Broadcasting ed., 1990). Moreover, the notion of caste is not strictly limited to Indian Hindus.
Some empirical studies include non-Hindu groups as castes in descriptions of particular
regional caste structures. See, e.g., Imtiaz Ahmed, Endogamy and StatusI Mobility Among
the Siddique Sheikhs of Allahabad,in SOCIAL STRATIFICATION 213 (Dipankar Gupta ed.,
2d ed. 1992); C.J. Fuller, Kerala Christiansand the Caste System, in SOCIAL STRATIFICA.
TION, supra,at 195.
A detailed description of the highly complex notions of varna and caste and their
substantial regional variations is beyond the scope of this Article. For a more complete
description of these related notions, see DAVID G. MANDELBAUM, SOCIETY iN INDIA
(1970) (two volume treatise on caste, familial and village structures in India); ADRIAN C.
MAYER, CASTE AND KINSHIP IN CENTRAL INDIA (1960). See also CELE:MN BOUGLE, ESSAYS ON T=i CASTE SYSTEM (D.F. Pocock trans., 1971) (containing widely cited essays on
the origins and operation of India's caste system).
166. Even during the period of British rule, indigenous notions of societal relations
prevailed to some extent in India. The British had a long-standing policy in India of applying indigenous law, albeit in their own tribunals, with respect to family matters, inheritance, caste, and religion. See GALANTER, supra note 157, at 18-19.
167. M.N. Srinivas, Varna and Caste, in SOcaAL STRATIFICATION, supa note 165, at 28.
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of Hindus referred to169as "untouchables"' ' fall outside both the varna
and caste structures.
Although caste is a highly complex social structure with substantial regional variation, it has been broadly described as dividing a sodety into hereditary groups with three predominant characteristics:
hierarchical organization, detailed rules designed to ensure separation
of the groups from each other, and the division of labor among the
groups. 170 The caste system's six principal features reflect these predominant characteristics.' 7 ' First, caste entails the segmenting of society into smaller subgroups whose membership is determined by
birth.1'7 Thus, one generally cannot, through individual effort or particular achievement, move from one caste to another. 17 Second,
these subgroups are arranged into a hierarchy with clearly defined
high and low castes.' 74 Although the mid-level castes also fall within
the hierarchy, there is more likely to be disagreement about the order
in which they fall in a given regional hierarchy., 5 Third, the caste
system limits the persons from whom a member of a given caste may
accept prepared foods. 76 Fourth, in many parts of rural India, residential segregation on the basis of caste is common. 177 Fifth, although
there is not a strict correlation between caste and occupational group,
caste limits a person's ability to freely chose an occupation. 78 This
168. In an effort to remove the stigma of the term "untouchable," Mohandas Gandhi
referred to these noncaste Hindus as "Harijans," which translates as "Children of God."
See STANLEY WOLPERT, INDiA 129 (1991). More recently, some former untouchables have
rejected the Gandhian terminology and term themselves "dalits." See V.S. N,,PAuL, IN.
DiA: A THOUSAND Murn,,ns Now 95 (1990). See also UNrroucHAB ! Voicrs oF TH
DALrr LIBERATION MormremNr 4 (Barbara K. Joshi ed., 19S6).

169. Srinivas, supra note 167, at 28 (referring to former untouchables as falling outside
of the varna scheme).

170. Dtmiorr, HmRARc-cus, supra note 155, at 43 (citing Celestin Bougle's classic
definition of caste).
171. See G.S. Ghurye, Featuresof the Caste System, in SoctaL STRArinFCATION, s1pra
note 165, at 35.
172. Id. at 36-38.

173. Id. Limited intercaste mobility is,
however, available through marriage in some
regions for certain castes. See id. at 46-47.
174. Id. at 38.
175. Id See also Srinivas, supra note 167, at 31; Bougle, The Essence and Reality of the
Caste System, in SocIAL STRATnmCATiON, supra note 165, at 69.
176. Ghurye, supra note 165, at 39-41. The caste-based restrictions on food preparation
and consumption are highly complex and depend in part upon the type of food at issue and
how it was prepared. See MIAYER, supra note 165, at 33-47 (describing distinction between
kacca (unripe) and pakka (ripe) foods and how caste-based limitations related to their
preparation and consumption operate in one North Indian village).
177. Id. at 41-43.
178. Id at 44-46.
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limitation results not from legal coercion but from intra-caste pressure
to follow the customary occupation of the caste and to refrain from
engaging in any occupation deemed to be demeaning o:r polluting. 179
Sixth, caste places restrictions on marriage. 80° Again, although some
regional variations exist, the norm is that marriage oulside of one's
own subcaste is prohibited. This is a social rather than a legal
requirement.18
Despite the relaxation of these caste-based limitations in urban
areas,'8 2 the constitutional prohibition of discrimination on the basis
of caste,83 and the legal abolition of untouchability, 184 the caste system continues to substantially influence life in India. In his descriptive work on popular Hinduism, C.F. Fuller notes that caste "is not an
abstract, hidden principle of social organization; it is a visible dimension of everyday life in rural India, which is part of everyone's social
and personal identity in a very real sense."' 8 5 Indeed, caste not only
limits individual choice with respect to such fundamental decisions as
marriage and occupation, but also at times leads to violence."8 6
179. Id
180. Il at 46-48.

181. The matrimonial classified advertisements in the English language Indian newspapers, through which many Indian families seek spouses for their children, shed some light
on the social significance of caste in the marital context. Caste is frequently discussed in
such advertisements. Many seek a bride or groom from a given caste or subcaste, while
others assert that caste is "no bar." Relatively few advertisements completely omit references to caste. See, e.g., SUNDAY TIMES OF INDIA, Apr. 18, 1993, at 2-6.

182. See McKim Marriott, Multiple Reference in Indian Caste Sysems, in SOCIAL
supra note 165, at 49 (describing the differences between urban and rural
social structures in India and suggesting that status in urban areas is measured largely by
the individual's and the group's behavior and attributes).
183. INDIA CONsT. art. 15.
184. Id.art. 17 (abolishing untouchability and criminalizing its practice).
185. FULLER, supra note 158, at 13.
186. For example, three low caste Hindus were recently killed by high caste individuals
in a village outside of Mysore in a dispute over the right of the lower castes to enter a
newly renovated temple. Avinash Singh, Caste Clash Mars Ugadi Festwal, HINDUSTAN
TIMEs, Mar. 27, 1991, at 24. The low caste individuals were killed by a group of approximately eighty persons wielding cycle chains, sickles, iron rods, and clubs. Id. A leader of
STRATIFICATION,

the lower caste community asserted that "our awareness of our rights

. . .

is creating

problems for the upper castes." Presumably, this is a reference to the legal requirement
that former untouchables be permitted to enter Hindu temples. Historically, such persons
were excluded from most temples and, despite the legal requirement of access, such exclusion continues, especially in rural areas. See FULLER, supra note 158, at 16. The attack,
while particularly savage, was not a mere aberration. See, e.g., AKBAR, supra note 151, at
45-76 (describing the massacre of Harijans in the state of Uttar Prade,.h in 1981); UNt
TOUCHABLE! VOICES OF THE DALrr LIBERATION MOVEMENT, supra note 168, at 4 (noting
Indian government figures showing that violent attacks against former untouchables routinely exceed 10,000 cases per year).
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Caste is, of course, not the only indicator of the importance of
group identity and the concomitant devaluation of individual preference in Indian culture. Empirical data and anecdotal evidence suggest
that the vast majority of Indian marriages are still arranged by the
couples' families. So-called "love marriages," in which the bride and
groom make the decision to marry for themselves, are generally confined to the urban elite.' s7
Following marriage, many Indians live in pre-existing units referred to as joint families." s Joint family structures take a variety of
forms, but most variations entail several nuclear families, usually an
elderly couple, their sons, and their sons' wives and children, living in
one structure with a communal kitchen.1 S9 Like caste, this common
Indian living arrangement diminishes the importance of individual autonomy and favors consideration of group welfare. Joint family life
often extends even to the commingling of assets. In such households,
all family members' earnings are paid to one person, usually the father
or eldest brother, who makes expenditure decisions for everyone
within the household. 90
The treatment of Hindu widows in India is another example of
the systemic devaluation of personal preferences and autonomy.
While the treatment of Indian women is discussed extensively elsewhere' 9' and is beyond the scope of this Article, the status-based
treatment of Hindu widows provides a particularly compelling example of the elevation of group identity over individual preference.
Upon the death of her husband, a Hindu woman historically was denied the right to wear colorful clothing or ornamentation of any
kind. 92 Remarriage, at least for upper caste widows, was prohib187. FULLER, supra note 15S, at 14. Much of the anecdotal evidence collected by the
author comes from the rural areas to the west of Delhi in Northern India. Numerous
individuals asserted to the author that both within the villages and provincial cities arranged marriages are still the norm and that in most instances the bride and groom are not
even permitted to meet prior to the marriage ceremony. Id.
188. See MANDELBAUM, supra note 165, at 43-45; GuNTHE-DiErZ SONm NI' P, THE
JorNT HrNDU FA m.y: I-s EVOLUTION AS A LEGAL.J lSTUrLrloN (1977) (historical account
of the Hindu joint family); WOLPERT, supra note 16S, at 133-36.
189. Id.
190. SoNTHEihmR, supranote 188, at xx (describing related notions -that a man's prop-

erty serves family purposes and that a father and son own the property rather as a kind of
trust for many others besides themselves" as the essence of the joint Hindu family).
191. See, e.g., ELISABETH BUMtILLER, MAY You BE THE MOTHER oF A HUNDPRD
SONS (1990).

192.

FULLER, supra note

158, at 22-23.
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ited.193 Fuller asserts that although the rigidity of these limitations has
lessened in recent years, "[i]t is still widely believed that [the widow]
has suffered a great misfortune in surviving her spouse. She may even
be blamed for his death, because a good wife predeceases her husband."'194 This treatment illustrates the elevation of group over individual identity; the widow's feelings are wholly irrelevant to how she
is to behave after her spouse's death. She cannot even make choices
concerning dress or demeanor based upon her own feelings or
preferences. 195
The foregoing is not intended to demonstrate a complete absence
of consideration of individual autonomy in Indian society. It does
suggest, however, that the autonomy-based conception of the Indian
Judiciary reflected in the basic features limitation is at odds with wellentrenched Indian social norms. It is for this reason that the Judiciary's self-conception may further rather than interfere with the constitutional framers' social reform objectives, by rejecting a status based
approach for the application of legal norms.
IV.

Conclusion

The framers of the Indian Constitution set the stage for an interbranch conflict when they both vested substantial powers in the Indian Judiciary to safeguard individual liberties and afforded to Parliament considerable ability to amend the Constitution as political
circumstances warranted. As a consequence, from the earliest days of
the Indian union, the Judiciary has striven to preserve the individual
liberties guaranteed by the Constitution's fundamental rights provi193. See Pauline Kolenda, Widowhood Among "Untouchable" Chulras,in CONCEPts
OF PERSON: KINSHIP, CASTE, AND MARRIAGE IN INDIA,

supra note 163, at 172-220 (sug-

gesting that widow remarriage is prohibited among the high caste Rajputs but encouraged
among the low caste Chuhras).
194. FULLER, supra note 158, at 23.
195. Indeed, the mere deprivation of ornamentation is mild compared to the practice of
sati. Sati refers to a widow's self-immolation on her husband's funeral pyre. Although
outlawed by the British in 1829 and never universally practiced in India, Sali still occurs on
occasion in modem India. When it does occur, it is considered by some to be laudable. See
V.N. DATrA, SATI: A HISTORICAL, SOCIAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY INTO THE
HINDU RITE OF WIDOW BURNING 231-33 (1988); FULLER, supra note 158, at 23. Although
some defend sati as a voluntary act, pressure on widows to perform sati was noted as early
as the eleventh century. See DATrA, supra at 9 (citing Alberuni's assertion that the mistreatment of widows made sahi the more desirable course for some). Moi'eover, considerable evidence suggests that sari is not always voluntary. See BUMILLER, ..upra note 191, at
62-74 (discussing the burning to death of eighteen year old Roop Kanwar on her husband's
funeral pyre).
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sions, while Parliament has used its amendment power to curtail such
judicial activity. This conflict culminated in the Indian Supreme
Court's articulation of the basic features limitation, which purports to
limit Parliament's ability to alter the Constitution's basic features despite its seemingly unequivocal power under the Constitution to do so.
At first blush, the Court's Marburianview of its role in the constitutional scheme would seem to conflict both with the framers' conception of inter-branch relations and with their narrow view of individual
liberties. Given that Indian society is organized according to principles that are fundamentally at odds with the framers' objective of creating a noncaste-based society, however, 196 the Court's view of its role
in India's national government may prove central to the transformation of Indian society. Thus, the Court's broad construction of its
guardianship role with respect to individual liberties may further the
framers' reformist agenda by rejecting a status-based approach to the
application of legal norms.
196. Aus-rr, supra note 2, at 26.

